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Introduction
One of the questions raised by this
important and thought-provoking
collection of essays on torture is how
and why the consensus that torture
is wrong—a consensus enshrined in
international law for decades—has
become so fragile. As Scott Anderson
writes in the introduction to this
volume, “[h]ow did abusing and tor-
turing prisoners suddenly become so
popular?” (2). The chapters in this
volume offer insights into this ques-
tion from the perspectives of history,
psychology, law, philosophy, and
sociology. This interdisciplinary
approach highlights important and
often overlooked aspects of the
torture debate. Yet, the questions
that the authors take to be important
(for example, about whether the justi-
fication of torture should even be con-
templated) reflect different and
sometimes incompatible normative
assumptions about what torture is
and about what matters in the torture
debate. These assumptions, I shall
argue, are shaped by, and play a role
in shaping, the moral, political, and
social narratives that contribute to or
resist the toleration of torture in the
US and elsewhere. Thus, while the
disparate nature of the contributions
(perhaps inevitably) undermine the
cohesiveness of the volume as a
whole, it illuminates, even if it does
not resolve, larger questions about
the place and function of academic
debate in the history and use of
torture.
In this essay I use the chapters in
this volume as a starting point to
explore the connection between the
torture debate and the toleration of
torture. In section I, I consider
why the justification of torture is a
matter for debate at all. What do
we learn by contemplating hypothe-
tical cases of justified torture, such
as those discussed by Jeff
McMahan and David Sussman in
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their chapters? I argue that the
assumption that torture is “on the
table” reflects the fact that torture
is already part of our social imagin-
ation in a way that is not true of
other acts of brutality, such as
rape. Section II examines why we
are willing to contemplate, con-
struct, and publicly defend cases of
justified torture but not cases of jus-
tified rape. I argue that the indivi-
dualized torture narrative that
informs much of the debate about
torture—the depiction of torture as
a single act against a guilty individ-
ual, performed solely for the “pure”
motive of saving lives—distorts our
understanding of what torture is
and reinforces and masks multiple
levels of torture toleration in US
society. To understand the toleration
of torture, we must start not from a
supposedly neutral consideration of
hypothetical cases, but by learning
about the reality of torture. Section
III examines what we can learn
about torture from the accounts of
torture and torture practices found
in this volume: about the nature of
torture, the purposes of torture, the
victims of torture, and the narratives
and institutional structures that
sustain the use of torture. Finally, in
section IV, I suggest that the chapters
in this volume help illuminate how
torture in the US is tolerated both
directly, through intentional policies
and practices, and indirectly,
through institutional structures and
political and legal narratives which
enable torture to occur. This analysis
of different levels of torture tolera-
tion reveals how deeply torture is
embedded within US history and
institutions, and how this toleration
is sustained and reinforced by
certain ways of thinking and talking
about torture.
I. Why Are We Debating Torture?
To begin, I want to consider the ques-
tion raised in the first chapter in the
volume, by Albie Sachs: why is
torture a matter for debate at all?
What are we hoping to learn from
arguing about whether torture could
be permissible?What kind of questions
should we be asking about torture?
Sachs, a survivor of torture in South
Africa, describes the shock of hearing
a philosopher apply a cost-benefit
analysis to the question of torture. In
Sachs’s view, to dedicate time and
energy to debating the justification of
torture is like “weighing up the pluses
and minuses of slavery or blackmail
or child abuse” (21). As he notes, it is
unlikely that academic debates about
the justifiability of torture would be
held in countries that had actually
experienced systematic torture, such
as Chile, Argentina, or South Africa.
Sachs is suggesting that to consider
such a debate as reasonable and
worthy of a public platform—to view
torture as “on the table,” evenhypothe-
tically—represents a failure to under-
stand what torture does to victims, to
torturers, and, indeed, to the state
itself. In his view, to engage in such a
debate is to give credence to a position
that simply should not be up for
discussion.
Sachs’s essay raises a question
about privilege, knowledge, and
ignorance. On the one hand, to be
able to contemplate, write, and talk
about torture as a purely hypothetical
possibility (and to be invited to public
platforms in which to do this, such as
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the conference from which this book
resulted) represents a kind of social
and moral privilege in the sense that a
person invited to speak about the
ethics of torture is accorded the
status as an expert on the morality of
torture.1 But it also reflects a privileged
ignorance, because it presumes that we
can (and perhaps should) debate
torture in a way that is abstracted
from the realities of torture. But this
presumption is based on ignorance
about the nature and purposes of
torture and the reality of torture in
the US, and a failure to see the
victims of torture. Torture in the US
is not and never has been a matter of
merely hypothetical debate. Instead,
torture is embedded in US history
and institutions, including the insti-
tutions of slavery, punishment, and
national security. Assuming that we
can start the debate about torture
from a supposedly objective consider-
ation about whether torture can be
justified—and assuming that torture
can be used for just purposes only
against those who are morally liable
to torture, as Jeff McMahan does in
his chapter in the volume (197)—
fosters this privileged ignorance by
cultivating the pretense that the
debate about torture is a debate
about what we might do, and not a
debate about what we have done.
1. Defenses of Debating Torture
Jeff McMahan defends the value of
using hypothetical cases to debate
the ethics of torture in his chapter
“Torture andMethod in Moral Philos-
ophy.” McMahan hypothesizes that
Sachs’s opposition to debating
torture is appealing because Sachs is
innocent: “The effectiveness of Sachs’
descriptions [of torture] would be
lost, not if they referred to
hypothetical circumstances, but if the
victim were clearly not innocent and
the aims of the torturers were clearly
just” (197). McMahan argues that
hypothetical cases of justified torture
can serve important theoretical
goals, such as helping us understand
why torture is objectionable (205). In
McMahan’s view, our intuitions
about hypothetical cases support a
liability-based (rather than a utilitar-
ian) justification of torture in ticking
bomb cases: the terrorist has made
himself liable to be tortured by his
moral responsibility for a continuing
threat of serious harm that only
torture can prevent (200).2
David Sussman also criticizes
absolutist positions on torture in
his chapter “Torture, Self-Defense,
and Fighting Dirty.” Drawing on
Thomas Nagel’s distinction between
“clean” and “dirty” fighting in war
(220),3 Sussman suggests that torture
appears to be a quintessential
example of “dirty fighting” because
it is directed at the victim’s person
and forestalls the “relations of
mutuality and reciprocity” involved
in treating the victim as a subject
(229). However, Sussman argues that
torture may still be permissible in
order to “frustrate an act of terrorism
or torture already in progress” if there
are no other reasonable options,
because in such a case the wrongful
acts to which torture is responding
have already made reciprocity and
“full reconciliation morally imposs-
ible” (228,230). Both McMahan and
Sussman, then, link the permissibility
of torture to the torture victim’s
wrongful acts and how those wrong-
ful acts alter the moral framework of
torture. Both authors argue that con-
structing hypothetical cases of per-
missible torture is valuable, even if
such cases might be extremely rare.
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Yet Sussman’s and McMahan’s
defenses of debating torture (and
the use of hypotheticals to do so) is
not convincing. Firstly, McMahan
describes Sachs’s argument as “essen-
tially a sustained appeal to moral sen-
timent” (196), yet himself appeals to
“moral sentiment” to justify his
refusal to consider whether torture
as punishment could be justified: “I
find the view… that people can
deserve to be tortured deeply repel-
lant” (211). This dismissal sits unea-
sily with his rejection of moral
absolutism about torture. If contem-
plating ticking bomb cases helps us
understand what is objectionable
about torture, as McMahan claims,
why couldn’t we learn important
information about torture through
contemplating cases of justified
torture as punishment? It doesn’t
seem far-fetched to imagine a person
whose crimes are so horrendous that
they deserve torture, even if we
don’t think the state should necess-
arily inflict torture as a punishment.
But since McMahan offers no argu-
ment in support of the “deeply repel-
lent” idea that “people can deserve to
be tortured,” we are no closer to
understanding what it is about
torture that explains why it is so
“deeply repellant.” Thus, though
McMahan argues that hypothetical
cases can teach us what is objection-
able about torture, in fact we do not
learn anything about the nature of
torture from his examples. We do
learn that some people believe that
it’s permissible to torture a guilty ter-
rorist, but this does not tell us any-
thing important about the morality
of torture, since, while desert claims
and liability claims are different (as
McMahan notes [211]), it is not
obvious that people’s intuitions are
reliably tracking liability judgments
rather than desert judgments.
Marcia Baron addresses a second
problem with defenses of ticking
bomb hypotheticals in her chapter
“The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical.”
Initially, the idea that any ethical ques-
tions should not be debated (or at
least not given a public platform)
seems contrary to the value of free
speech and academic debate. And
yet we do treat some morally atro-
cious acts as not up for debate, such
as rape. We do not think, for
example, that an academic conference
on sexual violence ought to, in the
interest of presenting “both sides,”
invite speakers to defend the possi-
bility of justified rape. As Baron
points out:
We are expected to be prepared to answer
questions about whether we would torture, or
want others to torture, in a ticking bomb
scenario, yet are not expected to answer
questions about whether we would be willing
to rape someone, or order or abet a rape, if that
were necessary to prevent a catastrophe of
massive proportions (193).
So, why is constructing and defend-
ing cases of permissible torture
viewed as a legitimate contribution
to the torture debate that warrants a
public platform (invitations to
present at conferences, contribute to
edited collections, and so forth), but
constructing and defending cases of
permissible rape is not? The answer
cannot be that the ticking bomb
hypothetical is “more realistic than
most,” as McMahan suggests (198).
Firstly, some authors question
whether any real-life cases could
meet the highly specified conditions
of the ticking bomb scenario,4 but
even defenders of torture concede
that the odds of a real-life case
meeting the criteria of justified
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torture are very low. Their defense of
hypotheticals doesn’t rest on the
claim that such cases are likely to
occur in real-life. For example, the
likelihood of a real-life case fitting
Sussman’s description of an instance
of permissible torture—where
torture is necessary to prevent an
already-occurring instance of torture
—is vanishingly small. Instead, the
use of hypothetical cases is defended
on the grounds that they help illumi-
nate important moral distinctions
and reveal problems with moral abso-
lutism. Yet, if the main point of these
cases is to illustrate such theoretical
points, it is worth asking why
McMahan and Sussman (and others
who defend torture using hypotheti-
cal cases) never use hypothetical
cases of justified rape, even though
such cases would serve their theoreti-
cal purposes equally well. Sussman
implicitly acknowledges this when,
in his rejection of absolutism, he
points out that “similar to rape, it is
hard (though not impossible) to
devise a moderately realistic scenario
in which tangible predicted benefits
of torturing would outweigh the
badness of the act itself” (233, my
italics). Sussman thereby acknowl-
edges that it would be possible to
create a hypothetical scenario in
which rape might be permissible,
even justified.
Secondly, sexual violence is a
frequently used torture method.
Defenders of torture can’t rule out
sexual violence as a torture method
without falling afoul of the moral
absolutism they reject. McMahan
and Sussman (and others who take
similar views) are, by defending
torture, also defending the possibility
that rape can be used as a form of
torture. We are therefore warranted
in inquiring further into why the
ethics of torture are up for debate
while the ethics of rape are not, and
why defenses of torture are given
academic, legal, and political airtime
when defenses of rape are not.
Answering this question will, I
suggest, help us answer the question
raised by Scott Anderson in the
introduction to the volume: Why
are we so willing to entertain the
possibility of torture?
II. Contemplating Torture and Tolerating Torture
Marcia Baron hypothesizes that we
are willing to contemplate the possi-
bility of justified torture but not justi-
fied rape because “we are still
bedeviled into thinking that torture
is generally effective…We have not
fully abandoned the idea that torture
will work when nothing else will”
(193). In his chapter on the history of
US torture of prisoners of war, Chris-
topher Einolf also references a belief
that torture “was useful” as a partial
explanation for the use of torture
(121). Yet, a belief in torture’s efficacy
does not explain our willingness to
contemplate justified torture. Firstly,
there is consistent and compelling evi-
dence that torture doesn’t work.5 In
their chapter “Police Interrogation
and Coercion in Domestic American
History: Lessons for the War on
Terror,” Richard Leo and K. Alexa
Hoenig demonstrate that torture not
only failed to produce reliable infor-
mation during the War on Terror
(165), but false intelligence gained
from torture also “wasted US
resources as false leads were
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pursued” (169). Indeed, information
gained under torture has led to the
torture of innocent people, as
occurred to the two men falsely
accused by Khalid Sheik Muhammed
under torture.6 Torture’s unreliability
was recognized very early in the
history of torture. As Kathleen
Coleman points out in her chapter
“The Fragility of Evidence: Torture
in Ancient Rome”: “while torture
was thought to be a means of securing
truth, at the same time—paradoxi-
cally—it was recognized that it was
likely to produce falsehoods and
injustice” (107). The discrepancy
between the persistent belief that
torture could work and the actual
(and well-documented) failure of
torture to reliably produce good infor-
mation and true confessions suggests
that, despite appearances, the contin-
ued support for the contemplation of
justified torture has little to do with
objective assessments about torture’s
effectiveness.
1. Torture and State Power in the
Social Imagination
A willingness to devote time and
energy to the construction of hypothe-
tical cases of justified torture, and to
publishing and defending such
cases, reflects a willingness to imagina-
tively tolerate torture in a way that
does not appear to be true of rape.7
Now, those who defend cases of justi-
fied torture will (rightly) object that
the creation of hypothetical cases of
justified torture does not imply
support for any existing torture prac-
tices. True, but the same could be
said about constructing, defending,
and publishing cases of justified
rape. Yet, the mere willingness to
devote time and energy to construct-
ing and defending cases of justified
rape would, I suspect, be viewed as
deeply problematic (indeed, “deeply
repellant,” to borrow McMahan’s
phrase) quite independently of
whether or not we took such cases to
apply to any real-life instances of
rape.
Here, one might point out that the
scale of sexual assault against women
and the lack of severe punishment for
perpetrators suggests that we do toler-
ate rape. This is undoubtedly true.
However, the difference between our
toleration of torture and our tolera-
tion of rape has to do with the
context in which the torture debate
occurs. The torture debate overwhel-
mingly focuses on the context of ter-
rorism—a fact reflected in the nature
of the hypotheticals used to defend
torture. The imaginative toleration of
torture thereby reflects and reinforces
background assumptions about the
scope of a state’s right to use force to
defend itself from perceived threats.
These background assumptions give
a veneer of legitimacy to the question
of torture that does not apply to the
question of rape. While we tolerate
rape in our society, we do not see
rape as within the range of legitimate
state forms of violence and so we
don’t tolerate the construction and
defense of theoretical cases of justified
rape within academic, legal, or politi-
cal debate about the limits and pur-
poses of state power.8
Another difference between our
attitudes toward rape and toward
torture lies in the status of the prohibi-
tion against torture in domestic and
international law. In his chapter
“Torture and Positive Law: Jurispru-
dence for the White House,” Jeremy
Waldron argues that the prohibition
against torture represents a “legal
archetype” that embodies and
reinforces the view that law “is not
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brutal in its operation” (275). As
David Luban argues, the historical
connection between torture and
tyranny means that liberal societies
must frame the use of torture as the
(tragic) choice of good people motiv-
ated only by the need to prevent dis-
aster since this is the only motive for
torture that is consistent with liberal
values.9 Thus, it is no coincidence
that the debate about torture in the
US starts with the creation of
hypotheticals in which torture is rep-
resented as an individual act (and
not, as it actually is, a “socially
embedded practice”10) against a
guilty person for the purpose of
saving lives. By shaping and rationa-
lizing the toleration of torture, this
individualized narrative of torture
enables torture to become imagina-
tively possible, thereby masking the
degree to which torture is embedded
in US history and institutions. As I
shall argue, the imaginative toleration
of torture reflects and reinforces the
actual direct and indirect toleration
of torture in US society across a
range of contexts in which state
power is wielded, including national
security contexts and within the crim-
inal justice system.
Instead of starting the torture
debate from the position of privi-
leged ignorance that characterizes
the individualized narrative of
torture, we learn far more about the
nature and purposes of torture from
looking at the reality of torture. The
reality of torture, as documented in
several chapters in this volume,
stands in stark contrast to the
framing of the torture debate as
representing a new and unprecedent
choice, “a dramatic break from the
past,” as Leo and Koenig put it in
their chapter (148). Instead, these
accounts reveal that torture has
been enmeshed in US police, military,
intelligence, and even educational
culture for decades, characterized
by consistent and utterly predictable
patterns of practice and justificatory
narratives. We are willing to imagi-
natively tolerate torture because we
do tolerate the use of torture by the
state and our willingness to imagine
cases of justified torture contributes
to the fragility of the prohibition
against torture.
III. The Reality of Torture
1. The Purpose and Impact of Torture
Albie Sachs’s chapter and William
Gorman and Sandra Zakowski’s
chapter “The Many Faces of Torture:
A Psychological Perspective” offer
powerful testimony about the impact
of torture on victims and the purposes
of torture. For many of the victims
described in Gorman and Zakowski’s
chapter, torture shatters “a fundamen-
tal sense of security and connection”.
The experience of torture is consist-
ently described as “disempowerment
and terrorization, a breaking of body
and spirit, through the causation of
mental and physical pain” (45).
Sachs’s account demonstrates how
the use of torture is rarely about the
pursuit of information—he describes
being tortured by sleep deprivation
despite the fact that any information
he had at that point was two years
old. So why was he tortured? “The
battle was not even about information.
It was about breaking me. It was about
showing that they were stronger, that
they were more powerful” (25). As
Sanford Levison has argued, the
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phenomenology of torture, like that of
slavery, is about creating “a phenom-
enological reality of total control.”11
From the victim’s perspective, torture
expresses, in the clearest way possible,
the torturer’s refusal to acknowledge
any limits on what may be done to a
person. Similarly, a state’s willingness
to use torture represents a commit-
ment to what Lisa Hajjar describes in
her chapter “In Defense of Lawfare”
as a “hyper-sovereigntist” (299) view
of state power—the view that there
ought to be no constraints on the
state’s right to use force to protect
itself from perceived threats (300).
Since this view of state power is anti-
thetical to the liberal rejection of politi-
cal tyranny, the justification of torture
in democratic states aims to reconcile
torture with this rejection of
tyranny.12 Such a reconciliation is
impossible, however, because torture
is inherently a form of tyranny.
In contrast to the image of “torture
motivated by just causes” that is the
centerpiece of the individualized
torture narrative, torture is intrinsi-
cally connected to breaking a person
and demonstrating total domination
over them. As Leo and Koenig
explain, during the era of police
torture known as the “third
degree,”13 the purpose of torture
was “forcing confessions” (154). It
didn’t matter whether the confession
was true or not; what mattered was
the existence of the confession. That
the primary purpose of torture is
“breaking” victims is also clear from
training manuals for torturers. The
CIA’s KUBARK Counterintelligence
Interrogation manual, for example,
praises techniques such as extended
sleep deprivation, manipulation of
noise and heat, and forced standing
on the grounds that these methods
are “devastatingly effective” in
breaking down prisoners’ mental
and physical integrity.14 The aim to
“break” victims—to deliberately use
pain and distress to disempower and
terrorize a person who is helpless—
cannot be separated from the “pure”
aims of gaining information. To
pretend that these aims can be separ-
ated—that there could a case of
“pure” interrogational torture—
demonstrates precisely the privileged
ignorance I discussed earlier. This
becomes even clearer when we
examine the contexts in which
torture has been used in the US.
2. The Practice and Justification of
Torture
The chapters by Leo and Koenig,
Einolf, and Mary Ann Case describe,
respectively, the use of torture in the
contexts of law enforcement, combat,
and in initiation rites in military
schools and academies. Despite focus-
ing on very different historical con-
texts, all three chapters reveal
similarities in the narratives used to
justify torture. The narratives and jus-
tifications used to defend torture take
three common forms: appeals to
exceptionalism, denial of the harm of
torture, and delegitimization of
torture victims.
a) Appeals to Exceptionalism
In the police and military context, the
choice to use torture is frequently
depicted as a (regrettable) necessity
created by a new and unprecedented
threat. For instance, Leo and Koenig
describe how, during the time of the
third degree, the concept of a “‘new’
kind of war… permeated society”
(162). References to a “new” kind of
war were also used during the Bush
Administration to justify the use of
torture (161). Similarly, appeals to
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exceptionalism were used by US
forces to justify the torture of cap-
tured prisoners in the Philippine War
(1899-1902) and in the Vietnam
War.15 Einolf hypothesizes that
torture was used in these conflicts,
but not during the Mexican War or
the Civil War, primarily because
these conflicts were framed as coun-
terinsurgencies, involving guerilla
fighters who were perceived as “ille-
gitimate enemies” (135) who were
“underserving of the protections that
are due by law or custom” (136).
Like Leo and Koenig, Einolf finds
strong parallels between these justifi-
catory narratives and the defense of
torture offered during the Bush
Administration’s war on terror, and
uses these parallels to critique these
narratives (138–9). The claim that
torture is a tragic choice forced upon
good people facing new and terrible
threats is also, as we have seen,
characteristic of the individualized
narrative of torture presented in
many torture hypotheticals. This nar-
rative thus reflects and reinforces the
appeals to exceptionalism that perme-
ate the actual practice of torture.
b) Denial of the Harm of Torture
A second common feature of justifica-
tory narratives of torture is the denial
that the methods used are torture.
Case’s, Leo and Koenig’s, and
Einolf’s chapters reveal striking simi-
larities in both the specific torture
methods used in the different contexts
they discuss, and in how the harm of
these methods is minimized. Leo
and Koenig note striking similarities
between the torture methods used
during the third degree and those
used in the war on torture, including
extended sleep deprivation, threats
of harm, temperature manipulation,
and noise bombardment (160). Einolf
describes how the use of the “water
torture” during the Philippine War
was dismissed as not “real” torture
(138). Case identifies strong simi-
larities between the abuses at Abu
Ghraib prison and the humiliations
inflicted during hazing rituals in mili-
tary academies and fraternities and
highlights the gendered implications
of these methods, such as the “use of
feminization as a means of… break-
ing individuals” (96–7). Some com-
mentators used the similarity
between hazing rituals and the
abuses at Abu Ghraib to dismiss the
severity of detainee abuse. Rush Lim-
baugh, for example, claimed that the
abuse of detainees “was hazing, it
was an out-of-control fraternity
prank” (91). The minimization of the
harm of torture serves two related
purposes. Firstly, it alleviates the
moral responsibility of the torturers
by enabling the illusion that what
they are doing is not “really” torture,
and, secondly, it helps to reconcile
the use of torture with liberal moral
and political commitments by
drawing a (false) distinction between
“real” torture and torture “lite” or
“enhanced interrogation.”16
c) Delegitimization of Torture Victims
The history of torture and the testi-
mony of torture victims reveals that
the denigration of victims is crucial to
understanding the toleration of
torture. The point is not that torture
victims are dehumanized through
being tortured—although that is
clearly true—but rather that torture
becomes imaginatively possible only in
relation to those who are already dele-
gitimized. As Scott Anderson argues,
democratic states like the US resort to
torture primarily against “people who
are regarded as quite distinct from the
dominant ethnic/racial/religious
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groups doing the torturing” (245). In
contrast to the individualized narrative
of torture, in which torture is a single
act against a person who is morally
responsible for harm, in reality torture
victims are selected not because of
their actions but because of their mem-
bership in a torturable class. The mem-
bership of a potential torture victim in
a “torturable” class is necessary
because the use of torture requires a
refusal to see the victim’s status as a
person as setting limits on what may
be done to them. The history of
torture reveals that those who were
initially classified as “torturable” were
already viewed as having lesser moral
standing. It was permissible to torture
them not primarily because of what
they had done or because of infor-
mation they might possess, but
because of who they were. Torture
thereby serves to reinforce and re-
inscribe (literally on the body of
torture victims) distinctions in the
moral, social, and political status of
those who may be tortured and those
who may not. For example, in Ancient
Rome, as Kathleen Coleman points
out, torturewas (at first) onlypermitted
on slaves (105). In Medieval Europe,
Leo and Koenig note, torture was not
permitted against “children, the
elderly, pregnant women, knights,
barons, aristocrats, kings, professors,
and… the clergy” (167).17 In Italy in
the late Middle Ages, torture was only
permitted against noncitizens and
slaves—“[c]tizens had dignity and
were thus inviolable.”18 This demon-
strates that the choice to use torture is
not basedonabelief in torture’s efficacy
in producing information or confes-
sions, but rather reflects and reinforces
the pre-existing moral exclusion of
some groups from the normative
status that would make torturing
them unthinkable.
Yet, the restriction of torture to a
class of torturable victims is rarely, if
ever, maintained. In Rome, the
class of those who could be tortured
widened to include “lower-end
citizens, the humiliores, and in time,
the emperors did not care about
anyone’s civic immunity.”19 A similar
pattern occurred in Italy, where even-
tually “citizens also could be tortured
if they were of bad moral repu-
tation.”20 Leo and Koenig describe
how the use of torture expanded
during the war on terror. While secret
renditions were initially limited to a
small class of prisoners, “it quickly
spread to include a much wider and
ill-defined population that the admin-
istration termed ‘illegal enemy comba-
tants’” (167). The expansion of the class
of torture victims is utterly predictable.
Once no limits are acknowledged to
apply to state power over individuals,
little stands in the way of expanding
the boundaries of such power.
The narratives and justifications
described above play an important
role in legitimizing and normalizing
torture, and in making the use of
torture appear consistent with demo-
cratic purposes and values. Here we
can see the intersection between
these narratives and the individua-
lized narrative of torture created and
sustained through the use of hypothe-
tical cases. It is no accident that these
hypothetical cases reflect and
reinforce a narrative of torture very
similar to the narratives that accom-
pany and normalize the actual practice
of torture. Indeed, far from being a
merely academic thought experiment,
reference to hypothetical cases has
played an important role in the legal
and political justification of torture
in democratic states and in fostering
public acceptance of torture. For
example, in 1999, the Israeli Supreme
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Court ruled that torture was illegal,
but that security officials accused of
torture could plead necessity in
ticking time-bomb cases.21 In the US,
reference to ticking bomb-type scen-
arios appears in the August 1, 2002
memo on the “Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation” prepared by the
Office of Legal Counsel for the
White House. The memo argues that
the necessity defense could be avail-
able to military personnel charged
with torture in circumstances very
like those that characterize standard
torture hypotheticals:
A detainee may possess information that could
enable the United States to prevent attacks that
potentially could equal or surpass the
September 11 attacks in their magnitude.
Clearly, any harm that might occur during an
interrogation would pale to insignificance
compared to the harm avoided be preventing
such an attack.22
Thus, the individualized narrative of
torture is not a harmless philosophical
thought experiment: it has a real
impact on the ways in which torture
is practiced and justified.
There is a further way in which
the individualized narrative of
torture distorts our understanding
of the reality of torture. By forcing
our attention onto a narrow and
highly abstract picture of torture,
the individualized narrative
excludes consideration of the
broader moral, political, and social
framework in which actual torture
flourishes and instead drives the
debate into positions of either
defending or refuting the individua-
lized narrative. This means that we
fail to examine torture in contexts
beyond the narrow discussion of
torture and terrorism and fail to
consider the possibility that insti-
tutional practices and systems can
create torture practices that are not
the product of intentional policies
or individual decisions. In the final
section, I explore what it would
mean to expand our thinking
about torture in these ways.
IV. Two Levels of Torture Toleration
The chapters in Confronting Torture
expose the scope of torture toleration
in the US and elsewhere. We see evi-
dence of the acceptance and prolifer-
ation of torture within the criminal
justice system, the legal profession,
the police force, the military, and intel-
ligence services. However, more can
and needs to be done to truly under-
stand the nature of torture toleration
in the US. In this last section, I
extend the question about what
torture is beyond the scope of this
volume to show how torture tolera-
tion takes place on at least two dis-
tinct levels.
1. Direct Torture: Torture as Policy
and Intentional Act
The chapters in Confronting Torture
primarily focus on torture as part of
a deliberate policy: torture against ter-
rorism suspects, captured prisoners,
criminal suspects, and political
opponents. As I outlined in Section
III, the justificatory narratives of
such torture are characterized by
appeals to exceptionalism, denial of
the harm of torture, and the creation
of a class of torturable victims. Such
uses of torture are typically justified
by reference to supposedly legitimate
state purposes, such as protecting the
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state from threats to national security.
In reality, however, these forms of
state torture reinforce differential
moral statuses among groups (the
difference between those who may
be tortured and those against whom
torture cannot be contemplated) and
express, in the clearest possible
way, a rejection of limits on state
power.
There is another context in which
torture as a deliberate policy occurs,
which is, unfortunately, not
addressed in any detail in Confronting
Torture: torture as punishment.23 A
number of authors have argued per-
suasively that solitary confinement—
a practice common in US prisons—is
a form of torture.24 Like the use of
torture against terrorism suspects,
the use of solitary confinement rep-
resents an expression of total state
power over the individual and
reinforces and reflects the diminished
moral status of prisoners—dispropor-
tionately prisoners of color—who are
subjected to it.25 Torture in the terror-
ism context is justified by claims that
those subject to it are morally liable
to be tortured, which masks the way
in which torture operates to select
and reinforce the demeaned moral
status of torturable groups. Likewise,
the common justification of solitary
confinement as deserved punishment
for the “worst of the worst”26 masks
the moral exclusion of those groups
subjected to it. This suggests that
there are important connections
between the function of torture and
the justificatory narratives that
sustain the use of torture in the secur-
ity context and in the context of pun-
ishment that have been insufficiently
explored in the torture debate.
Torture as policy and practice is
the most visible form of torture tolera-
tion in the US. Hence, it is not
surprising that the torture debate has
focused almost exclusively on this
kind of torture. However, one of the
effects of this narrow focus is a
failure to consider the possibility
that torture can occur in the absence
of direct intention. Because the
torture debate tends to devolve into
defenses of or responses to the indivi-
dualized narrative of torture, a kind
of “tunnel vision” results regarding
what torture is and the context in
which torture occurs. By contrast, if
we don’t start with the assumption
that torture must be the result of
direct intention, we have room to
explore the possibility that torture
can occur in a broader range of con-
texts. Torture can occur indirectly, in
the context of what I call torturous
institutions.
2. Indirect Torture: Torturous
Institutions
A tortuous institution is an institution
in which acts that constitute torture
are permitted to occur, even if they
are not part of institutional policy or
practice. The prison system in US
society is an example of a torturous
institution. The US prison system is
an institution in which intentional
torture occurs (the use of solitary con-
finement) and in which torture is
allowed to occur. Prison rape and
sexual assault (perpetrated by prison-
ers against other prisoners, and by
guards against prisoners) is common
in US prisons, to such an extent that
it is taken for granted—prison rape
is the subject of jokes and threats by
police officers and is regularly men-
tioned in depictions of prison in
popular culture.27 Sexual violence is,
as I noted earlier, a form of torture.
Sexual violence against prisoners
meets the definition of torture not
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only because of the suffering inflicted
by sexual violence but because the
victim is a prisoner.28 It is indirect
torture because while sexual assault
is not part of an intentional policy,
the failure at both the institutional
and policy level to seriously tackle
sexual violence in prison indicates
that such sexual violence is willingly
tolerated.29 This toleration is further
reinforced by the lack of public
concern for this issue. As with the jus-
tificatory narratives of torture dis-
cussed earlier, prison sexual abuse is
rarely described as torture, and the
victims are rarely believed but are
demeaned or ignored.30 Arguably, as
with attitudes toward intentional
torture, the toleration of prison rape
and the denigration of victims
expresses the devalued status of the
victims, a status that is taken to
license and excuse their treatment.
This raises the possibility that the tol-
eration of sexual abuse of prisoners
serves a similar function to the use
of intentional torture: it reinforces
and reinscribes the moral devaluation
of prisoners that is already a central
aspect of the US prison system.
Conclusion
Direct and indirect torture serve
related purposes connected to the
demeaned moral status of the victim
and the expression of state power.
Exploring these connections and devel-
oping a deeper understanding of the
forms of torture and the ways in
which institutional practices, academic
debate, and narratives of torture
sustain different forms of torture tol-
eration, is an essential next step in the
torture debate. The interdisciplinary
nature of the chapters in Confronting
Torture offers a valuable starting
point in this process by providing
insights into the nature of state
torture, but also reveals some of the
problems with the way the torture
debate has traditionally been framed
around an individualized narrative.
Thus, what is missing from the
volume helps us see what further ques-
tions need to be asked about the tolera-
tion of torture.
Notes
1 I thank Margaret Urban Walker for her
helpful comments on this section.
2 I won’t address McMahan’s theory of
liability to defensive harm here. However,
Scott Anderson notes at least one problem
with McMahan’s view in his chapter
“Torture as an Unjust Means of War.”
Anderson argues that McMahan’s view col-
lapses the distinction between combatant
and civilian that is a cornerstone of inter-
national law on armed conflict (247 n30).
3 While both McMahan and Sussman cri-
ticize moral absolutist positions on torture,
they defend a legal absolutist position on
torture. Sussman, for example, argues that
“states have reasonably agreed to ban the
use of torture in international law because
it is a barbaric act that is predictably coun-
terproductive to the aims for which a war
may be justly fought” (237).
4 Baron makes this argument in her
chapter, for example. See also Luban, “Liber-
alism,” andWolfendale, “Training Torturers.”
5 See O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t Work
and Schiemann, Does Torture Work? for com-
pelling evidence of the inefficacy of torture.
6 See Schiemann, Does Torture Work?, 224.
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7 Here I am drawing on Iris Young’s dis-
cussion of violence in the social imagination.
In “Five Faces of Oppression,” Young
argues that “[v]iolence is a social practice.
It is a social given that everyone knows
happens and will happen again. It is
always at the horizon of social imagination,
even for those who do not perpetrate it…
The idea of rape will occur to many men
who pick up a hitch-hiking woman; the
idea of hounding or teasing a gay man on
their dorm floor will occur to many straight
male college students” (27). Young’s point is
that our attitudes towards violence, and the
kinds of violence we see as inevitable or
even normal (like the sexual assault of a
hitch-hiking woman) are a product of what
we are willing to tolerate and thus see as
imaginatively possible.
8 I thank Theresa Tobin for raising this
point and for her helpful comments on this
paper.
9 See Luban, Torture, Power, and Law, 56.
10 Gordon, Mainstreaming Torture, 7.
11 Levinson, “Slavery,” 151. See also
Scarry, The Body in Pain and Sussman,
“What’s Wrong with Torture?”
12 See Luban, Torture, Power, and Law.
13 The era of the “third degree” refers to a
period of time during which police brutality
against criminal suspects was widespread,
from roughly the end of the nineteenth
century to the mid-1930s. See Leo and
Koenig’s chapter for a detailed discussion
of the history and end of the third degree.
14 See McCoy, A Question of Torture, 49.
15 Einolf excludes torture against slaves,
and the rape and abuse of Native American
populations from his analysis. In fact, he
argues that despite “many reports of vio-
lence against noncombatants, including
rape, the massacre of prisoners, mutilation
of bodies, and taking body parts as
trophies” there is “almost no evidence of
torture” by US troops against Native
American tribes (124). This suggests that
Einolf is using a very narrow definition of
torture, although he does not make this
clear.
16 See Wolfendale, “The Myth of Torture
Life.”
17 Leo and Koenig cite Conroy, Unspeak-
able Acts, Ordinary People, 29–30.
18 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, 50.
19 Ibid., 527. See also Coleman’s chapter.
20 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, 50.
21 See Luban, Torture, Power, and Law,
81–2.
22 Cole, The Torture Memos, 92.
23 Waldron does mention the prohibition
of torture in prison as part of his argument
about the centrality of the prohibition
against torture in US law (276–7).
24 See Conley, “Torture in US Jails”;
Guenther, Solitary Confinement; and
Kerness, “Torture in US Prisons.”
25 See Flagg et al., “Who’s in Solitary
Confinement?”
26 Guenther, Solitary Confinement, 162.
27 See Femifesto, “Debunking Myths
About Rape” and Bruenig, “Why Ameri-
cans Don’t Care.”
28 See Waldron’s chapter “Torture and
Positive Law,” 277 n.69.
29 What I say could also apply to the
institutional toleration of other forms of
prisoner mistreatment that amount to
torture, such as the denial of food, and
exposure to extreme heat or cold.
30 See Femifesto, “Debunking Myths
About Rape.”
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